Cosmological

This ended up being a very short summary of the Cosmological Argument (unfortunately it is not without flaw, so pardon for the typos and semi-lack of substance). Personally, I don't believe the cosmological argument is the strongest of arguments for theism, and some objections to the argument should not be ignored. However, the argument is successful in bringing up some very interesting topics that could elaborated upon

Evaluating the Cosmological Argument
The cosmological argument is an a posteriori, theistic argument. First off, an argument that is a posteriori is based upon a premise dependent upon “our experience of the world,” and the premise may only be known by those means. Next, a theistic argument is one that argues in favor of the existence of a theistic God; conjunctively, theism states there exists a being (God) that has four unique, characteristic traits: 1) omnipotence, 2) omniscience, 3) omnibenevolence, and 4) is the creator of everything else that exists. The cosmological argument, as is presented by William Rowe, states: 1) every being (that exists or ever did exist) is either a dependent being or a self-existent being, 2) Not every being can be a dependent being, 3) Therefore, There exists a self-existent being. Now, the cosmological argument is a deductively valid argument, because if its premises are true then its conclusion must also be true; however, just because an argument is deductively valid does not in any sense make it sound. This paper will firstly present and explain the cosmological argument as is portrayed by William Rowe; secondly, this paper will seek to evaluate the cosmological argument by the means of analyzing the argument’s premises. The first portion of this paper, the presentation of the argument, will outline the major and minor premises of the cosmological argument as well as detail the supportive evidence and reasoning behind the premises themselves. The second portion of this paper, the evaluation of the argument, will present and explore any evidence that runs counter to that of the evidence in support of the cosmological argument as well as appraise the integrity of the cosmological argument as discussed by William Rowe.
I.
The first premise of the cosmological argument states that any given being that exists, or ever did exist, is either a dependent being or self-existent being. The reasoning in this first premise is rooted in Anselm’s three cases and basic principle. Anselm establishes three categories that essentially denote that whatever exists has an explanation of existence; these three cases being: a) explained by another (dependent), b) explained by nothing, and c) explained by itself (self-existent). Furthermore, Anselm’s basic principle accepts that whatever exists has an explanation of its existence; therefore, the principle rejects that any sort of “b” could exist or has ever existed. By the eighteenth century, this basic principle was augmented, further elaborated, and named the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). PSR is an adaptation and elaboration of Anselm’s basic principle and now consists of two parts: 1) whatever exists has an explanation of its existence and 2) there must be an explanation to any positive fact whatever. As it is, the proponent of the cosmological argument would naturally accept PSR since the first part of PSR serves as the justification of the cosmological argument’s first premise, and PSR goes on to play a foundational role in the reasoning of the cosmological argument. Lastly, if one accepts PSR in both parts, one should believe premise one of the cosmological argument is in fact true.
The second, and the most crucial, premise of the cosmological argument states that the world could not just contain a causal series of dependent beings; however, the most obvious question raised towards this premise would be, “why not?” In order to explain the supportive reasoning behind premise two, Rowe first sets forth a common, but also often mistaken as substantial, minor premise for the second premise. This minor premise states: 1) There must be a first being to start any causal series, 2) If every being were dependent there would be no first being to start the causal series, 3) Therefore, not every being can be a dependent being. Rowe states that although this argument is valid, the first premise does not take in to account that the causal series of dependent beings could indeed progress (and has progressed) ad infinitum; instead, the first premise relies on the false assumption that a causal series had a starting first member at some point in its past history. After discussing this, Rowe goes on to say that the proponents of the cosmological argument in the eighteenth century recognized that the causal series could indeed be infinite, but they rejected the idea that every being that exists or ever existed is dependent simply because there is a lack of explanation for the series of causal beings or in Rowe’s words, “for the fact that there are and have always been dependent beings.” Lending back to the foundation and conditions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the cosmological argument proponent would agree that a causal series of dependent beings does satisfy part one of PSR; although, the series fails in satisfying part two of PSR because the example of dependent beings that have always been producing dependent beings is not a sufficient explanation of the series or the fact there are and have always been dependent beings.
II.
Although Rowe outlines the premises of the cosmological argument with supportive and persuasive evidence, Rowe also points out several points of discussion that are contrary to the evidence provided for the cosmological argument. The criticism of the cosmological argument lies with the justification of the second premise as well as the truth of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The most prominent criticism of the second premise regards the explanation of the collective series of dependent beings. The eighteenth century, skeptical philosopher, David Hume, best summed up the criticism by stating, “Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.” Essentially, the criticism is that the explanation of the existence for each dependent being serves as the same explanation for the whole collective of beings. Taking it a step further, one may even say that “the fact that there are and have always been dependent beings” could very well be a fact having no explanation at all, or a brute fact. Unfortunately, as compelling as this criticism may be, it really does not really serve to convince the proponent of the cosmological otherwise simply due to the fact that the criticism relies solely upon an assumption that the proponent would by no means except. This is so because, the proponent of the cosmological argument has already reasoned and holds to the fact that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is in fact true, and any debate over the criticism would not progress by any significant means for both sides. However, this stalemate does illuminate the greater issue and topic of controversy at hand. That issue being the truth of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which is the fundamental principle behind the cosmological argument. The requirements of PSR support both the first and second premise of the cosmological argument; likewise, if PSR is true the cosmological argument could be considered a deductively valid and sound argument. Unfortunately, PSR is not easily, if at all, shown to be true in an absolute sense. Proponents of PSR and the cosmological argument generally try to defend PSR in two different fashions. The first would be that PSR is known intuitively to be true, and with full understanding and reflection of PSR would lead one to see that it must be true. The issue with the claim that PSR is known intuitively to be true is that this concept is not blatantly accepted by all philosophers, most of which claim that the principle is false. For if PSR was known intuitively true, then there would be none who would claim the principle to be false. Much like the first defense of PSR but with some moderation, the second states that even though PSR is not known intuitively true it is still a basic and rational presumption of reason that people do make regardless of the amount of “sufficient” reflection. Like the first, this second argument also suffers from a fatal flaw. The fatal flaw being that PSR could still very well be false taking in to consideration the fact that even if PSR was presumed as true it would still be a presumption and not a guaranteed truth on the matter.
Without knowing for sure that PSR is true, a proponent of the cosmological argument cannot actually claim its premises are true either. Rowe concludes that since no one has successfully shown that PSR is, without a shadow of a doubt, true, it can be concluded that although the cosmological argument might be sound it still does not provide “good rational ground” to believe there is a being that exists and whose own nature accounts for that existence.